By Nicole Prevoo
When we ask ourselves, “do we have a duty to combat climate change?” or “should we use geoengineering when doing so?” or “can we not just ignore the problem and colonize Mars instead?”, who is this “we” we are referring to? We might refer to human beings, different people from different places, institutions rather than individuals, but also animals, all living things including plants, or what about future people? Are we not also concerned with the well-being of our offspring? It appears to be not that simple after all.
I am concerned here with that very first assumption: our moral duty to handle climate change as and for human beings. Interestingly, when talking about human beings we often disregard that these human beings are not a homogenous group at all. In fact, questions regarding climate change and the climate crisis often disregard one thing: who does the climate crisis actually affect? When we are asking ourselves how to deal with climate change, who are we really concerned with? Interestingly, the inclusion of animals and broader eco-systems is often addressed, but one group of people remains in the background: disabled people.What does this mean for our approach to climate change? In this article I will address how the climate debate has been disproportionately exclusionary of disabled people, a phenomenon known as eco-ableism. Unfortunately, with the (moral) questions regarding the climate crisis disabled people have been overlooked, ignored, and not included within the debate. Allow me to illustrate, with several examples, how this issue occurs.
First of all, when I speak of disabilities, I mean differences in capabilities that are restricting to a person in a society that is formed around the capabilities of the majority. Disabilities are therefore not understood as a negative condition a person has, but as a particular trait one has that disables one in vital aspects of living, such as employment and transport (Albrecht 2006, 3, 418; Cole 2007, 169; Barnes and Mercer 2010, 1-5). To be near or far-sighted then is not considered a disability as long as one is able to wear contacts or glasses and function sufficiently as a result. Being visually impaired or blind in such a manner that additional aids do not allow one to fully see, however, is a disability because it makes functioning in a society based on visuals much more difficult. As for cognitive disabilities, Down Syndrome for example is not a disability because it is a lack or limitation, but because society is not accommodating to people with a lower IQ than average.
To understand how disabled people are disregarded in the climate debate, it is important to have an understanding of the two notions that define discrimination against disabled people. The first is known as ‘ableism’. In the Oxford English Dictionary, ableism is defined as “discrimination in favour of able-bodied people; prejudice against or disregard of the needs of disabled people”, but this definition is slightly misleading (OED 2021). Ableism is better understood as the expectations we hold about the abilities certain species must have: as humans are supposed to walk for example while fish are supposed to swim. It is also important to note that abilities not only refer to the physical parts of the body but mental abilities as well. The second term is ‘disablism’. Disablism is not defined in the OED but can be understood as the unwillingness/refusal to accommodate for the needs of disabled people, or truly any being that does not fit the able-bodied norm (Albrecht 2006, 1-4; Wolbring 2012a, 294-95; Wolbring 2012b, 78-9).
To discriminate in favor of able-bodied people, then, more or less encapsulates both ableism and disablism; we are ableist when discriminating based on ability, but also disablist by favoring able-bodied people in the process, and therefore not accommodating disabled people. And when this happens, when disabilities are not being accounted for and thus excluded, that is discriminatory because able-bodiedness gets preferential treatment. Discrimination here entails the unfair treatment of persons based on their capabilities; when disabled people are not taken into account, they are not receiving equal treatment (Crenshaw 1989, 150-8; Albrecht 2006 1-4; Atray 2019, 79-80).
It is important to note these concepts do not function and occur in isolation, but are involved in and influenced by other factors, such as race, gender, and sexuality as well. Racism, for example, has occurred based on “judging cognitive abilities of various ethnic groups” and sexism uses the idea “that women do not have the ability of rational behavior” to discriminate against them (Wolbring 2012a, 295). Eco-ableism, then, is the intersection between environmentalism and ableism, where ableism and disablism are present in the social movements and advocacy for the preservation and protection of the environment known as ‘environmentalism’.
Let me illustrate how disabled people are excluded from and thus discriminated against in the climate debate with a few examples.
Animals and Disabled People
First, I turn to how it is argued animals ought to be morally considered. With the animal rights debate playing a role in environmentalism, as climate change will affect not only humans but all living beings on earth, it is argued that if mentally disabled people are included, animals ought to be included too. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, as well as Peter Singer, for example, make this claim.
Donaldson and Kymlicka have argued that the sense of ‘someone being home’ in other living beings is proof of having to protect such “vulnerable selves”. They make this argument against the idea that rationality or autonomy is needed to be protected, so only humans would need to be protected. They claim this argument is false because then also children and the “cognitively impaired” would not be protected because they also do not have full rationality and autonomy (25). In other words, their argument claims if we were to exclude animals in discussions on the climate then we would need to exclude disabled people too. Since we do not wish to exclude disabled people, animals should be included too. For the sake of consistency, therefore, if one acknowledges human rights, one must also acknowledge animal rights (28).
Peter Singer makes a similar argument. If we give mentally disabled people rights we ought to give animals rights too. He uses the example of the “permanently retarded human” or “imbeciles” to make the point that animals must have equal rights (Singer 1974, 113-15). It is important to note how the terms “retarted” and “imbecile” are considered to be “derogatory” and “offensive” and should no longer be used (OED 2021). Both an “imbecile” and a dog are not rational, he contends, and both are not responsible for being so, yet we consider it unfair to take advantage of “an isolated defect” but not of a dog (115). According to Singer we then arbitrarily favor our own kind over others (115). To make his argument, therefore, he compares the abilities of animals with that of disabled human beings.
Eco-ableism is present in this argumentation by Donaldson, Kymlicka and Singer because it puts the value of disabled people’s lives into question. As disabled people are still fighting for equality and emancipation today, putting that into question is truly disrespectful (Taylor 2017, 168). It is too much of a “gamble” to use disabled people for the question of rights when it constitutes “a group of people who have won basic rights and protections only within the past few decades.” and it “implicitly devalues and flattens out intellectual disability.” (168-69) Not only that, but to make this comparison assumes these abilities are somehow morally relevant because “the argument upholds reason as the yardstick of value.” (165) To distinguish between having sufficient mental capabilities or not puts into question the moral relevance of those who are assumed to lack these particular privileged abilities (165). In other words, reason or sentience is taken for granted as a morally relevant capacity, which inherently puts the relevance and privileges of those who are lacking, disabled people and animals, up for debate. Regardless of whether both ought to have equal rights then or not, it is a problematic and disablist argument to make. Reason is then used as a yardstick with which to judge who should or should not be included in environmental discussions.
Besides, this line of reasoning presented by Donaldson and Kymlicka, and Singer still puts the human at the center, because it uses ability expectations of the human as the determining factor for moral worth, while simultaneously assuming that all intellectual disability can be equated to the mental capabilities of animals to make the comparison (Taylor 2017, 169). Instead of arguing for animal rights in this manner, then, it would be more inclusive to question and argue against the idea of certain neurotypes being more valuable than others (Taylor 2017, 165-67). To go vegan, for example, could be a way in which one recognizes that the cognitive abilities of animals are not a reason to discriminate against them, just like it is not for people. To be inclusive of animals then, should not go at the cost of disabled people.
Future Generations and Human Engineering
The next example of eco-ableism concerns the argument regarding our duties towards protecting the environment for the sake of future generations. While it may seem obvious that we have such duties, research has shown that having moral duties towards people who do not exist yet is hard to prove. How this research was conducted, however, is where the discrimination against disabled people arises, and continues to prevail in climate debates today. One example of this is the influential work of Derek Parfit on the non-identity problem.
In short, the non-identity problem is the idea that whatever decision is being made now influences who will be born or not later. So if we decide to fight climate change, those actions will lead to certain people being born and not others, while deciding not to do so would lead to other people being born. In that sense, we are unable to exercise influence on the future generations who will end up existing (Parfit 1986, 359). To make this argument, Parfit used the example of a program that would allow women to choose between having a disabled and non-disabled child, stating how it would provide a “normal rather than a handicapped child,” to illustrate how the non-identity problem arises (Parfit 1986, 367). It should be noted how the term “handicap” is considered “dated or offensive” as can be seen in the ODE, and the OED recognizes that “disabled” is preferred (Stevenson 2015; OED 2021). This line of argumentation is an example of human engineering, however, which is eco-ableist.
Human engineering – changing biological structures – is both ableist and disablist: it rests on the assumption that certain abilities are necessary to live healthily and thus “better”, and it also disregards the question of whose future it is trying to ensure, thus excluding disabled people (as well as nonhuman animals and larger ecosystems for example) in the process (Wolbring 2013, 101). His example of the program pushes the narrative that humans can be altered in such a manner that any “defects” no longer pose an issue when they do not come into existence, which implies disabled people are “lesser” than those without disabilities, that any differences in ability ought to be eliminated. While Parfit does not necessarily argue this programme ought to be used, he does use this example for the sake of his argument. Therefore, he uses disablist rhetoric.
A similar argument is present in the work of Peter Singer, who actually justifies the killing of infants and preventing children with disabilities from being born (Lewiecki-Wilson 2011, 72-73, 80, 82-83). In his attempts to argue for animal rights, he has on two occasions expressed he does not take moral issue with infanticide, especially when parents decide their disabled child should not live, which is enough reason for abortion according to Singer (Singer 2005, 131-33; Singer 2003). One would think Singer might know better now, but he expressed in a more recent interview that he still considers infanticide and abortion to be allowed to prevent a disabled child from living (Gross 2021). Both Parfit and Singer are well-known figures in the climate debate, yet both use(d) (different) disablist rhetoric to make their argument.
Moreover, human engineering is in and of itself an example of eco-ableism, as it is also considered a means for humans to adapt to climate change. This again relies on ability expectations that inherently discriminate against disabled people, because “Disabled people can opt to be seen as inherently defective and subnormal, in need of being fixed by science and technology towards a societal norm of the so-called non-disabled.” (Wolbring 2009, 154) Human engineering can thus be used for the human species to survive at the hands of climate change but discriminates against disabled people in the process. It merely serves to ensure the future of enhanced human beings, and for that reason human engineering is eco-ableist.
Geoengineering
Another example of eco-ableism is geoengineering. The effort to alleviate climate change issues with geoengineering, to manipulate the environment by for example creating artificial clouds to reflect more sunlight and block out heat, must have a global impact in order to work. This also means, however, that any negative impacts of geoengineering will occur on a global scale, which will disproportionately affect beings who tend to be disregarded in the climate debate, including disabled people (Preston 2011, 458-59; Wolbring 2013, 100). Disabled people are more vulnerable to changes in the environment than non-disabled people, as they for example may face difficulties with evacuation, lose necessary equipment and/or healthcare, or not receive reliable power for their equipment (King and Gregg 2022, 4). Black, female, and/or lower-class disabled people especially are even more vulnerable to this (4-5). Therefore, geoengineering is disablist because it puts disabled people at an even higher risk, as negative consequences such as “exhibiting geotoxic problems” or climate-related events will disproportionately affect those with disabilities (Wolbring 2013, 100).
Individual Actions
The next two examples from the climate debate concern the actions individuals may undertake that implicitly disregard the needs of disabled people. The first one regards the objections against and banning of plastic straws. The use of plastic straws can lead to plastic pollution in the ocean that can lead to unnecessary harm and deaths (Caverly 2019, 372-73; Jenks and Obringer 2020, 152). However, people with certain disabilities rely on plastic straws to consume water, and sufficient alternatives do not yet exist (Jenks and Obringer 2020, 158). Paper/glass/silicone/metal straws, for example, are either a choking hazard, too costly, not positionable, an allergy risk, not sanitary enough, and/or risk injury to use (158). The point is that with the global “straw ban craze” the needs of disabled people are overlooked, which is disablist because it means disabled people are not given the same treatment as non-disabled people, who are being considered since they can function fine without plastic straws (157-59). One might even argue that since some disabled people rely on certain straws for survival, the climate debate is choosing the survival of the planet over the survival of disabled people.
The other example concerns the sensory issues autistic people face when eating certain foods, as research has shown, which makes dietary changes for the sake of the environment much more inaccessible (Crane, Goddard, and Pring 2009, 220-23; Chistol et al. 2018, 585-87). If the texture and/or taste of foods like soy or beans is triggering, for example, that makes the dietary change to vegetarianism or veganism much more inaccessible.
Other examples to think about include the inaccessibility of the United Nations climate conferences, the inaccessibility of emergency routes in case of a climate crisis (not everyone can simply walk upstairs with a flood), the overall disregard of being disproportionately affected by climate change due to health complications, and eco-friendly transportation alternatives not being accessible (not everyone can cycle, go on public transport, or use an electric car that cannot fit a wheelchair).
My point is not that fighting climate change is impossible for disabled people. It is just that disabilities are often not being accounted for which results in the issues mentioned above. By overlooking the needs of disabled people, they are deliberately counted as less because they do not receive equal treatment to non-disabled people. Therefore, these examples are eco-ableist. To find a way to work around that, the ableism and disablism must be prevented first.
In the end, it comes down to a question of meta-ethics: can a moral decision be made without fair consideration of all that is involved? The inclusion and needs of disabled people should not merely be an afterthought, they ought to be considered from the beginning like any other being on our only planet for it to be fair and moral decisions regarding the climate to be made. Questions concerning the climate crisis are important and should be addressed, but disabled people are entitled to be included in this questioning. And especially when considering the right answers.
Nicole Prevoo is afgestudeerd van de Research Master Philosophy aan de Radboud Universiteit. Hierbij volgde ze de Social & Political Philosophy specialisatie. Haar onderzoeksthema’s waren gericht op anti-racisme, beperkingen, en inclusie. Momenteel is zij op zoek naar een PhD plek om onderzoek te doen naar de representatie van beperkingen.
Nicole Prevoo graduated from the Research Master Philosophy at Radboud University. In this, she followed the Social & Political Philosophy specialisation. Her research topics focused on anti-racism, disability, and inclusion. She is currently looking for a PhD spot to conduct research on the representation of disability.
Dit artikel is gebaseerd op een essay geschreven voor het vak Climate Ethics aan de Radboud Universiteit. This article is based on an essay written for the Climate Ethics course at Radboud University.
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